Breach vs incident vs near miss: what to report and to whom
Under the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB), an incident is an event with an actual adverse effect on your systems. A personal data breach affects personal data. A near miss is harm narrowly avoided, and after Lords changes in October 2026 it is not reportable under the Bill.
Last updated · Precursor SecurityStatus checked : the Bill passed the House of Lords on 2 November 2026 and returns to the Commons to consider Lords amendments (no date set). On 4 November 2026 the Commons extended its carry-over, so it lapses if not passed by the end of 29 April 2027. It is not yet law. References are to HL Bill 62 (as amended on Report), so wording and numbering may still change in the final Act. This guide is general information, not legal advice.
Key points
- Under HL Bill 62, an incident must have an actual adverse effect on the operation or security of systems.
- Near misses are not reportable under the Bill; the Government has promised a voluntary near-miss mechanism.
- A personal data breach is reportable to the Information Commission if it is likely to risk people's rights and freedoms.
- One event can need a Bill notification, a UK GDPR notification, both or neither.
- Record every personal data breach, and keep near misses in an internal log.
What is the difference between a breach, an incident and a near miss?
A cyber incident, under the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB), is an event that has an actual adverse effect on the operation or security of your systems. A personal data breach, under UK GDPR, is a security breach affecting personal data. A near miss is an informal term for harm narrowly avoided, and after changes made in the House of Lords, near misses are not reportable under the Bill.
One event can be all, some or none of these, so assess each regime separately rather than relying on the label.
What changed at Report Stage?
The Lords narrowed the Bill. HL Bill 32 would have widened "incident" to events "capable of having" an adverse effect, and made data centres report incidents that "could have had" a significant impact. On 26 October 2026, Government amendments removed both. HL Bill 62, the text as amended on Report, only inserts "operation or" into the existing definition, so an incident still needs an actual adverse effect.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra, the minister, told the Lords: "The Bill now makes it clear that an incident is an event which has had an actual adverse impact on the security and operations of an entity's systems." She said the definition still covers ransomware and "pre-positioning attacks that have successfully compromised a security system", and committed to a voluntary near-miss reporting mechanism for all regulated entities, to be set up without primary legislation.
The Bill still needs Commons agreement to the Lords amendments, so check the final Act.
The decision table
| Cyber incident (the Bill) | Personal data breach (UK GDPR) | Near miss | |
|---|---|---|---|
| What it means | An event having an actual adverse effect on the operation or security of network and information systems | A breach of security leading to accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data | Informal: harm narrowly avoided. Not defined in the Bill |
| Report if | It meets your category's significance test | It is likely to result in a risk to people's rights and freedoms | Not mandatory. A voluntary route has been promised |
| Report to | Your regulator, with a copy to the CSIRT | The Information Commission | Internally; voluntarily once a mechanism exists |
| Deadline | 24-hour initial and 72-hour full notification, both from first awareness | Without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware | Set by your own policy |
| Tell others? | Data centres, RDSPs and RMSPs notify affected UK customers, then give updates | Tell affected people without undue delay if the risk to them is high | Consider customer contracts |
| Keep a record? | Keep your assessment as good practice | Yes. Record every breach, reported or not (Article 33(5)) | Yes, as good practice |
The Bill's duties are not in force. UK GDPR already applies.
What is the reporting test under the Bill?
It has two parts, and both must be met. For an operator of essential services (regulation 11), a relevant digital service provider (12A) or a relevant managed service provider (14E):
- Effect. The incident has affected, or is affecting, the operation or security of the systems relied on to provide the service.
- Impact. Its impact in the UK has been, is, or is likely to be significant, judged on factors including disruption, users affected, duration, geographic area, data compromise, impact on users' systems and impact on the economy or society.
For a data centre (regulation 11A), the incident must have had, be having, or be likely to have a significant impact on the operation or security of the systems relied on to provide the data centre service, or on the service itself.
See what counts as a significant incident for the factors in detail.
Worked examples
These are our reading of HL Bill 62 and UK GDPR, not rulings. Your facts could change the answer.
| Event | Bill: reportable? | UK GDPR: reportable? |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing email blocked at the gateway, nobody clicks | No: no adverse effect on systems | No: no personal data affected |
| User enters credentials, but multi-factor authentication stops the login | Unlikely: assess whether security was actually affected | No, unless data was accessed; record it |
| Attacker uses stolen admin credentials, contained within an hour | Possibly: security has been affected, so assess significance | Depends on what data was accessed |
| Pre-positioned malware found on a control system, nothing disrupted yet | Possibly: the minister said successful pre-positioning is covered; assess likely impact | Depends on data affected |
| Ransomware stops a managed service for many customers | Likely | Likely, if personal data was affected, including loss of availability |
| Laptop with strongly encrypted data lost | Probably not | Assess risk, likely low; record it |
| Email with customer data sent to the wrong person | No: not a systems incident | Assess risk; may be reportable |
| Data centre cooling fault caught before any effect | No under HL Bill 62: no actual effect | No, unless personal data was affected |
How should one process handle all three?
Your team should not have to decide which regime applies before raising the alarm. Use one route:
- Log it. Record the time, who found it and what is known.
- Triage it. A trained person checks whether systems or personal data were affected.
- Run each test separately. One line for the Bill, one for UK GDPR, and others that apply, such as contract terms or FCA rules.
- Start the clocks. Note when you first became aware, for each regime.
- Decide and record. Write down the decision, the reasoning and who made it.
- Notify. Use your 24-hour notification template and, for personal data, the reporting route of the Information Commission (formerly the ICO). See incident reports under the Bill and UK GDPR.
- Learn. Feed near misses into your risk register and a near-miss log.
What are the common mistakes?
Treating near misses as reportable under the Bill. After Report Stage, they are not. Over-reporting wastes time and regulator attention.
Treating near misses as irrelevant. They show which controls worked by luck. Regulators can still ask about incidents that could have had an adverse effect, through an information notice under new regulation 15, and the promised voluntary route will want good records.
Assuming one report covers everything. A notice under the Bill does not replace a UK GDPR notification, even though both may go to the Information Commission.
Waiting for certainty. The Bill's initial notice needs only brief details, and the full notice covers information "so far as known". UK GDPR also allows information in phases.
Discouraging staff from reporting small things. Keep the internal threshold low. The legal tests come later.
Sources
Frequently asked questions
A security incident under the Bill concerns network and information systems and needs an actual adverse effect on their operation or security. A personal data breach is a security breach that affects personal data. Many incidents involve no personal data, and some breaches, such as a misdirected email, involve no system compromise.
No. Government amendments at Lords Report Stage on 26 October 2026 removed the wider "capable of having" definition and mandatory near-miss reporting for data centres. An incident must have an actual adverse effect. The Government has promised a voluntary near-miss reporting mechanism for regulated entities instead.
False as a general rule. UK GDPR requires reporting to the Information Commission only where a breach is likely to result in a risk to people's rights and freedoms, although every breach must be recorded. Near misses are not reportable under the Bill, though your employer's internal policy may ask you to report them.
Yes. Ransomware that disrupts a regulated service and exposes customer data could need a notification under the Bill to your regulator, copied to the CSIRT, and a separate UK GDPR notification to the Information Commission. Assess and report each on its own test and timetable.
Yes. Keep the internal threshold low so a trained person can apply the legal tests, spot weak controls and decide whether anything is reportable. Good near-miss records also prepare you for the voluntary reporting mechanism the Government has promised for regulated entities.